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Abstract Fundamentality plays a pivotal role in discussions of ontology, super-
venience, and possibility, and other key topics in metaphysics. However, there are
two different ways of characterising the fundamental: as that which is not grounded,
and as that which is the ground of everything else. I show that whether these two
characterisations pick out the same property turns on a principle—which I call
‘‘Dichotomy’’—that is of independent interest in the theory of ground: that every-
thing is either fully grounded or not even partially grounded. I then argue that
Dichotomy fails: some facts have partial grounds that cannot be complemented to a
full ground. Rejecting Dichotomy opens the door to recognising a bifurcation in our
notion of fundamentality. I sketch some of the far-reaching metaphysical conse-
quences this might have, with reference to big-picture views such as Humeanism.
Since Dichotomy is entailed by the standard account of partial ground, according to
which partial grounds are subpluralities of full grounds, a non-standard account is
needed. In a technical ‘‘Appendix’’, I show that truthmaker semantics furnishes such
an account, and identify a semantic condition that corresponds to Dichotomy.
Keywords Fundamentality  Grounding  Truthmaker semantics  Humeanism
The question of what is fundamental in the world is of intrinsic interest. Moreover,
an answer to it can guide and constrain what we say about other central
metaphysical topics.
In discussions of ontology, it is a common view that the fundamental needs to be
considered as carrying a heavy weight, while the non-fundamental can taken to be
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light-weight. Such a differential treatment may be articulated in a variety of ways:
as the claim that fundamental properties are universals and non-fundamental ones
mere classes (Armstrong 1978; Lewis 1983); or that fundamental facts are states of
affairs and non-fundamental facts mere propositions (Armstrong 1997); or as the
general methodological maxim that Ockham’s razor should be wielded only against
putative fundamental entities (Schaffer 2015).
In discussions of supervenience, it is a common view that the non-fundamental
supervenes on the fundamental: the former is fully modally fixed by the latter. Thus
David Lewis:
I hold, as an a priori principle, that every contingent truth must be made true,
somehow, by the pattern of coinstantiation of fundamental properties and
relations. The whole truth about the world . . . supervenes on this pattern.
(Lewis 1999, 292)
The roles of fundamentality vis-a`-vis ontology and vis-a`-vis supervenience are
related. One obvious bridge between them is provided by Armstrong’s doctrine of
the ontological free lunch: ‘‘what supervenes is no addition to being’’ (Armstrong
1997, 12).
In discussions of possibility, it is a common view that the fundamental entities are
recombinable with each other:
[T]he fundamental actual concrete objects should be freely recombinable,
serving as independent units of being . . .. Thus each should be, in Hume’s
words, ‘entirely loose and separate’. (Schaffer 2010, 40)
[W]hatever the (contingent) fundamental elements of the world are, they are
open to free modal recombination. (Bennett 2017, 190)
The roles of fundamentality vis-a`-vis supervenience and vis-a`-vis possibility
complement each other in fully determining the space of possibilities: the
possibilities are all and only the recombinations of the fundamentalia.
The question of what is fundamental raises a prior question, which I shall be
focussing on here: what is it for a fact, object, or property to be fundamental? It is
natural to take fundamentality to be a matter of something’s place in the structure of
the world. Such structure is, in turn, naturally articulated in terms of a certain
relation. Indeed, once we have a term for such a relation—‘‘ground’’, by now
entrenched in philosophical discourse—then using it to characterize fundamentality
may not merely be optional, but required by the principle of ideological parsimony.1
What is fundamental may also be called the ‘‘foundations.’’ In a house, the
foundations can either be described in terms of what is below them—namely, no
other part of the house—or in terms of what is above them—namely, every other
part of the house. Since we are accustomed to think of grounds as lower than what
they ground, there are, correspondingly, two obvious strategies for defining the
fundamental in terms of ground: as that which is ungrounded, or as that which
1 For a recent defence of the strategy of using grounding to characterise fundamentality, see Mehta
(2017).
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grounds everything else. I shall say that these are, respectively, characterizations of
the fundamental as the ‘‘ungrounded’’ and as the ‘‘all-grounding.’’
Perhaps the structure of reality is not given just by one relation, but rather by a
family of relations which are not usefully amalgamated into one: the ‘‘building
relations’’, in the terminology of Karen Bennett (2017). If so, the same strategies for
defining fundamentality remain available, as long as each of these relations is
suitably vertically directed, with the relata on one side being thought of as lower
than those on the other side. The fundamental can then be thought of as the
‘‘unbuilt’’ or as the ‘‘all-building.’’ This is so regardless of whether ground itself is
or is not among the building relations, as in the views of Bennett and of Jessica
Wilson (2014), respectively.2
As I noted above, fundamentality is supposed to play a certain theoretical role in
discussions of ontology, supervenience, and possibility. Between them, the two
characterisations seem to account for its fitness to play that role. That the
fundamental is ungrounded explains why it should be taken to be ontologically
weighty, and why the fundamentalia do not modally constrain each other; that the
fundamental is all-grounding explains why the non-fundamental need not carry an
ontological cost, and why the fundamentalia modally constrain the non-
fundamentalia.
Both styles of characterization are ubiquitous in the literature. The implicit
assumption seems to be that they pick out the same notion. But the tenability of this
assumption is underexplored. Bennett and Michael Raven (2016) deserve credit for
contrasting the two characterisations explicitly, and exploring how they are related.
In Sect. 1, I shall extend one of Bennett’s results. This discussion sets the stage for
the main thesis of this paper: that the two characterisations may diverge.
My key move involves rejecting the orthodox account of the relationship between
the notions of full ground and partial ground: that something is a partial ground iff there
is something else together with which it is jointly a full ground. It follows from this that
everything is either fully grounded or not even partially grounded—a principle I shall
call Dichotomy. I give reasons to think that Dichotomy is false, and that the orthodox
account of partial ground should be rejected—a thesis that is of independent interest
for the theory of ground. If I am right, the notion of fundamentality bifurcates. Some
potential metaphysical consequences of this bifurcation are sketched in Sect. 5. In the
technical ‘‘Appendix’’, I identify a mereological condition that corresponds to
Dichotomy in Kit Fine’s truthmaker semantics for ground.
1 Two conceptions of the fundamental
If something is ungrounded, I shall call it ‘‘B-fundamental’’. (The letter B may be
taken to stand for ‘‘basic’’, but this no more than a memory aid.) This technical term
is defined as follows:
2 Wilson uses upper-case ‘‘Grounding’’ for ground, and ‘‘grounding relations’’ (lower case) for the
building relations. I take it that that difference is merely notational.
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f is B-fundamental =df there is no full ground for f.
An entity is thus B-fundamental just in case it is at the bottom of the hierarchy
generated by the relation of ground.
B-fundamentality may then be proposed as an explication of the notion of
fundamentality. On the face of it, this is a plausible proposal, and does not call for
extensive motivating commentary. I shall discuss its merits later, by comparing and
contrasting it to a rival explication.
I noted in the introduction that we might wish to characterize the structure of the
world using several relations—the building relations—rather than the one relation
of ground. If something is not built by any relation, Bennett calls it ‘‘independent’’.
To avoid the ordinary connotations of that term, I shall call it B-fundamental*
instead:3
f is B-fundamental* =df there is no C and building relation R such that RðC; f Þ.
If ground is a building relation, then everything that is B-fundamental* is
B-fundamental. If ground is the only building relation, then the converse is true as well.
I shall now turn to the second conception of the fundamental, as the all-
grounding. The idea is, roughly, that the fundamental entities are such that
everything in the world can be accounted for in terms of them—that they are
‘‘complete’’, in Bennett’s terminology. In my further discussion, I shall take the
fundamentalia to be facts. However, much of the discussion will carry over, mutatis
mutandis, to entities in other ontological categories.4
It is tempting to say that some facts are all-grounding iff every fact is
grounded in some of them. But there cannot be any such facts, provided some
fact is B-fundamental. A remedy that suggests itself is to make an exception for
the fundamental facts themselves—they need not be grounded, either by
themselves or by any other facts. So we could say that the fundamental facts are
those that provide a ground for every non-fundamental fact. However, this
clearly cannot serve as a definition of fundamentality: as such, it would be
circular.
To obtain a more careful formulation of the characterization of the all-grounding,
I shall introduce a ground-theoretic analogue of the familiar notion of a
3 The explication matches ‘‘the strongest sense of independence’’ that Bennett contrasts with ‘‘notions of
independence . . . that are indexed to a particular building relation’’: ‘‘A thing (fact, property, what have
you) is independent in this strongest sense just in case nothing builds it in any way whatsover; it is not the
output of any building relation.’’ (Bennett 2017, 112)
4 The discussion does not carry over, at least not immediately, to a discussion of the relationship between
the ground structure among facts and the fundamentality of entities that are constituents of these facts is
in question—the main theme of Raven (2016). For that reason, the frameworks of this article and that of
Raven’s cannot be straightforwardly compared.
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supervenience base. Say that C is a grounding base iff for every f that does not
belong to C, there is C0  C such that C0 is a ground for f.5
Being a grounding base is a good explication for what it is for some facts to be
complete, and thus to be candidates for being the fundamental facts. However, it is a
condition that the fundamental facts need to satisfy collectively, and does not give
us an explication of f’s being a fundamental fact without further work.6
It will not do say that f is fundamental iff it belongs to some grounding base.
Since the plurality of all facts vacuously satisfies the definition of being a grounding
base, that proposal would count everything as fundamental.
A more promising suggestion results from universally rather than existentially
quantifying over grounding bases (with ‘A’ suggesting ‘‘all-grounding’’):
f is A-fundamental =df f belongs to every grounding base.
The idea is that whatever full account of the world we offer, f will be an
indispensable part of that. Using terminology from Raven (2016, 609), we might
also say that f is ‘‘fundamental qua ineliminable’’. I shall adopt A-fundamentality as
my characterization of the fundamental in terms of all-grounding. (I shall say a bit
more about this choice in the final two paragraphs of this section.)
I have now offered two definientia for f’s being a fundamental fact. This prompts
the question how they are related. When discussing this, I shall appeal to the
following standard principle:7
A does not belong to any ground for A: ðIrreflexivityÞ
Bennett (2017, 112) shows that B-fundamentality entails A-fundamentality—that
‘‘[e]very independent entity is in every complete set’’. As it turns out, the converse
entailment holds as well, such that our two notions are equivalent:
Proposition 1 Suppose that ground is irreflexive. Then f is B-fundamental C, f is
A-fundamental.
Proof ): Suppose that f is not A-fundamental. Then there is some grounding base
C to which f does not belong. It follows that there is C0  C such that C0 is a ground
5 Compare Bennett (2017, 109): ‘‘[T]he complete entities are those that build, not everything, but
everything else’’ (emphasis hers).
The notion of a ground base is one conjunct in Kit Fine’s notion of a distributive ground for everything
(Fine 2012a, p. 54). Moreover, given plausible assumptions, we can show that C is a grounding base just
in case for every f, there is C0  C such that C0 is a weak ground, in Fine’s sense, for f.
6 Bennett (2017, 123) claims that ‘‘independence [B-fundamentality*] seems to me better suited as the
central concept of fundamentality.’’ Her reason is that in a ‘‘flat’’ world, where no facts stand in the
relation of ground, we count everything as fundamental because it is ungrounded, despite its failing to
ground anything else. This argument seems to me to show only that B-fundamentality is the central
distributive, rather than collective, concept of fundamentality. Suppose that we are asked, of all the facts
in a flat world, why they are, collectively, the fundamental facts. It then seems to be a good answer to
point out that nothing else fails to have a ground among them.
7 Along with many others, both Rosen (2010, p. 116) and Correia (2005, pp. 62–63) endorse this
principle, or ones that entail it. See also Kovacs (2018), cf. Jenkins (2011), Bliss (2014).
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for f. Hence f is not B-fundamental.
(. Suppose that f is not B-fundamental. Hence there is a ground C for f. By
Irreflexivity, f 62 C. Now let D be all the facts. Clearly, D is a grounding base.
Consider D n ffg (i.e. the set-theoretic difference of D and ffg), and let g be an
arbitrary fact. If f ¼ g, then C  D n ffg is a ground for g. If g 6¼ f , then
g 2 D n ffg. So D n ffg is a grounding base. That is, f does not belong to every
grounding base, and is not A-fundamental. h
The result that the two characterizations coincide is robust: it continues to hold if
we let fundamentality depend on several building relations, rather than the one
relation of ground, as I shall now show.
To generalize A-fundamentality, we first introduce the notion of a building base.
Say that C is a building base iff for every f that does not belong to C, there is C0  C
and a building relation R such that C0 stands in R to f.8
We can then define:
f is A-fundamental* =df f belongs to every building base.
Notice that the definitions of the starred concepts are like those of the unstarred
ones, except that the role of ground is now played by the disjunction of all building
relations—the relation
WB that holds between C and f just in case there is some R
among the building relations B such that C stands in R to f. That relation WB may
well fail to satisfy the criteria for being a building relation. For example, it may not
be asymmetric even if all building relations are asymmetric, and it may not be
transitive even if all building relations are transitive. But provided that every
building relation is irreflexive,
WB is irreflexive as well. The proof of Proposition 1
thus straightforwardly carries over to yield a generalized result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that every building relation is irreflexive. Then f is B-
fundamental* C , f is A-fundamental*.
Propositions 1 and 2 only rely on the assumption of irreflexivity. Other standard
assumptions, such as asymmetry or transitivity, are not needed; nor is the
assumption that chains of ground end in ungrounded facts. Even if there is an
‘‘infinite descent’’ of ground, then B-fundamentality and A-fundamentality
coincide.9 However, it needs to be acknowledged that A-fundamentality may not
be a good explication of fundamentality in terms of the all-grounding in such a
situation: the A-fundamental things will not, collectively, be a grounding base. Each
of them will be ungrounded, but they will not be jointly all-grounding.
8 I think that the notion of a building base matches the general notion of completeness that Bennett has in
mind:
The more intuitive notion of completeness is . . . one that quantifies over building relations: the
complete set at a world is the set whose members build, in one way or another, everything else.
(Bennett 2017, 110)
9 There are a variety of ‘‘well-foundedness’’ conditions in the vicinity here, but differences among them
do not matter for present purposes (Dixon 2016b; Rabin and Rabern 2016).
S. Leuenberger
123
It is not clear what should count as fundamental in the sense of all-grounding in
a world of infinite descent.10 Perhaps the most plausible thing to say is that the
notion is not defined relative to such a world. At any rate, I shall set such
scenarios aside for the rest of this paper. Many philosophers take them to be
incoherent anyway, and will not object to this restriction.11 Fans of infinite descent
may already be open to the idea that characterizations of the fundamental in terms
of being ungrounded and being all-grounding may diverge. But even for them,
there is something new in the rest of the paper: the claim that the two
characterizations can come apart even in the absence of infinite descent; and that
they can come apart even though both are defined, rather than one being defined
and the other not.
2 Disambiguating definitions of fundamentality
A-fundamentality and B-fundamentality are stated using a generic notion of ground.
Among the various distinctions in the family, at least one deserves attention in the
present context: that between full ground and partial ground. I will discuss this
distinction in more detail in a subsequent section; for now I only assume that ‘partial
ground’ is used inclusively, to apply to full grounds too.
When we characterise the fundamental as the ungrounded, we presumably have
the notion of partial ground in mind: only facts that are not even partially grounded
are wholly ungrounded. It is natural to relate fundamentality as ungroundedness to a
certain hierarchical conception of the world: an entity is fundamental, in the
relevant sense, if and only if nothing is below it in the hierarchy. But this
hierarchical structure of the world is typically articulated by the relation of partial
ground—a binary relation that we can represent in a graph. (The relation of full
ground, being plural on the left-hand side, does not lend itself to convenient
pictorial representation.)
When we characterise the fundamental as the all-grounding, in contrast, we
presumably have the notion of full ground in mind. In metaphysics, we are
interested in identifying collections of facts which are complete, in the sense of
accounting for everything. As the term ‘complete’ suggests, we are looking for full
grounding bases—where ‘ground’ in the definition of a grounding base is read as
‘full ground’. The fundamentalia should provide more than merely partial
10 A rival characterization to my A-fundamentality—one arguably favoured by Bennett, although she is
not explicit on the matter—is belonging to some minimal grounding base. A detailed comparison between
these two proposals would be technical and somewhat orthogonal to the main point of the present paper. I
shall merely point out that provided ground satisfies an infinitary version of transitivity (‘‘Cut’’ in Fine
2012b), then it can be proved that every fact that belongs to some minimal grounding base is
A-fundamental. Moreover, facts that are A-fundamental but do not belong to any minimal grounding base
are, intuitively, good candidates for being fundamental. In short: the notions will typically coincide, and
when they do not, I think A-fundamentality is preferable.
11 See Brzozowski (2008) and Schaffer (2010) in favour of ground always being well-founded; and
Schaffer (2003) against.
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grounds for everything else. This seems to be required by the theoretical role of
fundamentality vis-a`-vis supervenience: why should a mere partial grounding base
modally fix everything else?
To relate this discussion with our previous results, it will be useful to extend our
terminology. I shall say that f is strongly B-fundamental iff no C partially grounds it;
and weakly B-fundamental iff no C fully grounds it.12 Since any full ground of a fact
is also partial ground, strong B-fundamentality entails weak B-fundamentality, as
we might expect.
Further, I shall say that f is weakly A-fundamental iff it belongs to every full
grounding base; and strongly A-fundamental iff it belongs to every partial
grounding base. Since full grounds are partial grounds, every full grounding base is
a partial grounding base, and hence strong A-fundamentality entails weak
A-fundamentality. While the natural notion of completeness, which provides a
constraint on the fundamentalia collectively, is the stronger one—being a full
grounding base—membership in every strongly complete base is a weaker condition
than membership in every weakly complete one.
The mutual entailment of strong B-fundamentality and strong A-fundamentality,
as well as of the corresponding weak notions, are consequences of Proposition 1.
The logical relationship between our four notions are summarised in Fig. 1, with
arrows symbolizing logical entailment (on the assumption that full ground and
partial ground are both irreflexive).
The natural notions of fundamentality for individual facts are strong B-funda-
mentality and weak A-fundamentality—marked in bold in the figure. Inspection
of Fig. 1 confirms that strong B-fundamentality entails weak A-fundamentality.
However, the converse entailment has not been shown to hold. In the rest of the
paper, I shall discuss under what conditions it does hold.
strong B-fundamentalitystrong A-fundamentality
weak B-fundamentalityweak A-fundamentality
Fig. 1 Four candidate explications of fundamentality
12 Following Litland (2018), I here use a notion of partial ground that is plural on the left.
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3 Full ground and partial ground
One of our candidate explications of fundamentality—strong B-fundamentality—is
defined in terms of full ground, and the other—weak A-fundamentality—in terms of
partial ground. We need to take a closer look at these relations.
The distinction between full grounds and partial grounds does not map neatly to the
various words in philosophers’ English that the idiom of ground is supposed to
regiment—‘in virtue of’, ‘because’, ‘explains’, ‘accounts for’ and their cognates may
all be used to express claims of partial or of full ground.13 The contrast is analogous to
the one between a partial cause—which is often simply called ‘‘cause’’—and a full
cause—something that is typically too complex to cite.14 The distinction can be
elucidated by examples. Let us suppose that Anna’s being my niece is grounded in
Martin’s being my brother and Anna’s being Martin’s daughter. This is a case of full
ground: the grounds fully account for what is grounded. It also makes sense to say that
my being an uncle is grounded in Anna’s being Martin’s daughter. But here, we would
have a case of partial ground: the ground contributes to what is grounded. Furthermore,
it is a case of merely partial ground: the partial ground is not also a full ground.
Likewise, my having a mass is a partial ground for my attracting the earth. But it is a
merely partial ground, since a full ground would also include further facts, for example
the earth’s having mass and the holding of the law of gravitational attraction.
There is a reason why in ordinary usage, locutions in the relevant family are often
indicative of a connection of partial ground only. Once we go beyond toy examples
like the above, we would often find it hard to specify full grounds. What is the fact
that France is a nation grounded in, for example? Presumably, we could all cite, or
at least gesture at, several partial grounds—facts about its internal organization,
about international law, or, at a deeper level, about the intentions of its citizens. But
it would be very difficult indeed to cite any full grounds—especially so if
necessitarianism about full ground holds, that is, if the conjunction of the grounds
needs to strictly imply what is grounded. For then the grounds will typically also
include an indefinite number of facts relating to background conditions, or about the
absence of potentially interfering factors. But even on a non-necessitarian
conception, full grounds are often too large to specify.
As has often been remarked, the notion of ground is closely related to that of
metaphysical explanation. We are certainly familiar with the concept of a partial
explanation. When we ask for an explanation of some fact, we may get an answer that
partly satisfies what we are asking for. (Indeed, we typically do not request more than a
partial explanation in the first place.) A merely partial ground does not fully account
for the fact, but goes some way towards it. Or, to use another paraphrase, we can say
that to be a partial ground for a certain fact is to contribute to its holding.
On what is arguably the orthodox account, put forward by Correia (2005, p. 60)
and Rosen (2010, p. 115) among others, partial ground is defined in terms of full
13 For relevant discussion concerning ‘because’, see Schnieder (2011, 450).
14 In the views of Wilson (2018a) and Schaffer (2016), there is a very close relationship between ground
and causation.
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ground. In a slogan: a partial ground is a part of a full ground. Usually, ‘part’ is not
understood in the strict mereological sense here. Rather, something is a partial
ground if and only if it is one of some things that are, together, a full ground. Or to
put it differently: to a be a partial ground is to be completable to a full ground.
Presumably, such a definition is not intended to be merely stipulative, concerning
the use of a technical term. As I pointed out, many pertinent ordinary locutions are
supposed to express partial ground. I shall thus treat the orthodox account as asserting a
substantive claim about the relationship between full ground and partial ground.
The account is usefully broken down in two claims: that partial grounds are
extractable—being part of a full ground is sufficient for being a partial ground—and
that partial grounds are completable—being part of a full ground is necessary for
being a partial ground. I shall not discuss the extractability condition.15 My concern
will be with the question whether partial grounds are completable.
In fact, I shall mainly focus my discussion on the following consequence of the
claim that every partial ground is completable:
If f has a partial ground, it has a full ground. ðDichotomyÞ
Or in the terminology introduced earlier: if f is weakly B-fundamental, then it is
strongly B-fundamental.
If ground is dichotomous, then all of our four notions of fundamentality coincide,
as inspection of the figure reveals. In particular, it will turn out that the explications
of the fundamental as the ungrounded and as the all-grounding boil down to the
same thing.
4 Merely partially grounded facts?
In general, a partial F need not be a part of a full F. If my employer gives me a
partial reimbursement for my expenses, it does not follow that someone else will
reimburse the remainder, alas. Likewise, the world is full of examples of partial
success in the absence of full success. The question then is whether in the specific
case where F is ‘ground’—more precisely, ‘ground for g’, for some given g—there
always needs to be a full F.
Completability has been largely unchallenged in the literature on ground. The
following suggestive passage by Kit Fine is a notable exception:
[There is] a natural partial notion of ground for which a partial ground need
not always be part of a full ground. One might wish to say, for example, that
the truth that P is a partial ground for knowledge that P, even though there is
nothing one might add to P to obtain a strict full ground for knowledge that P
(as in the view of Williamson 2000). (Fine 2012a, p. 53)
I shall not discuss whether the truth of P should indeed count as a non-
completable partial ground of knowledge that P, on Williamson’s theory. Whether it
15 For some examples that might be taken to motivate the rejection of that condition (although they are
put forward for a different purpose by the author), see Schaffer (2012, 126–9).
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is or not, it seems to me that the ‘‘knowledge first’’ theory does not provide us with a
counterexample to Dichotomy.16 Certain facts about Fred’s brain, about his
environment, and about how he causally relates to the environment are modally
sufficient for Fred’s knowing that P.17 While Williamson does not use the idiom of
ground himself, it is natural to say that those facts, or perhaps some relevant
subclass thereof, jointly ground Fred’s knowing that P. What Williamson denies is
that any (possibly disjunctive) brain conditions, or any (possibly disjunctive)
environmental conditions, are necessary as well as sufficient for knowing that P. His
claim is that knowing that P cannot be analysed with P as a conjunct, not that facts
involving that property are ungrounded.18
Similar remarks apply to cases that involve causation or action rather than
knowledge. That c and e both happen may be a non-completable partial ground of
c’s causing e; and that my arm goes up may be a non-completable partial ground of
my raising my arm. In neither case, however, do we have good reason to think that
there are no full grounds of the relevant facts.
I am, however, sympathetic to the idea that Dichotomy fails, and shall now
sketch two potential counterexamples. The first one involves an imaginary scenario,
and does not rely on specific metaphysical commitments; the second one turns on
certain theoretical ideas about totality.
Consider the following scenario. In worlds wþ and w, a determinable quality, to
be called ‘‘schmarge’’, is instantiated. Schmarge is akin to electric charge in
displaying a positive–negative polarity. The space of its determinates is simpler,
though—it has only two rather than infinitely many determinates. We may call them
‘‘positive schmarge’’ and ‘‘negative schmarge’’, but like in the case of electric
charge, these labels are entirely arbitrary. Positive schmarge is no more similar to
positive charge, or to positive growth, than it is to negative charge, or negative
growth, respectively.
In worlds wþ and w, there are no infinitely descending chains of ground.
Moreover, those worlds are mereologically atomic. Atoms tend to cluster in
stable aggregates, which we may call ‘‘molecules’’. The laws of nature of wþ and
w are such that a molecule has schmarge if and only if it is composed of an even
number of atoms, all of which have the property F. That property is fundamental in
both worlds, and every atom that has it does so contingently. Among the molecules
with schmarge, some are positive, and some negative. However, for any given
molecule with schmarge, it is a brute fact what its polarity is. There is no law linking
its polarity with its composition, or with any of its other intrinsic features. (To be
sure, there is a law linking the distribution of positive and negative schmarges with a
16 Here I am indebted to comments by David Liggins.
17 In the words of Williamson (2000, 80): ‘‘[L]et a be any case in which a prime condition C obtains, and
D and E respectively the strongest narrow condition and the strongest environmental condition which
obtain in a. Then it is plausible that the conjunction D ^ E entails C’’.
18 A necessary and sufficient condition would be a disjunction of conjunctions of internal and external
conditions, which is not in general equivalent to a conjunction of a disjunctive internal condition and a
disjunctive external condition.
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field of intermolecular forces, but that field is generated by the positive and negative
schmarges, rather than explaining them.)
Positive and negative schmarge exhibit a distinctive failure of supervenience. In
wþ, molecule a has positive schmarge. But in world w, a has negative schmarge.
Yet every fundamental fact of wþ obtains, and is fundamental, in w—except
possibly the fact that a has positive schmarge, whose status as fundamental or non-
fundamental shall not be pre-judged. Likewise, every fundamental fact of w
obtains, and is fundamental in wþ—except possibly the fact that a has negative
schmarge.
Prima facie, the schmarge scenario is metaphysically possible. Positive and
negative schmarge do not supervene on the fundamental properties of their atomic
parts, but their instantiation by a whole still has a certain configuration of the parts
as a necessary condition.
It seems to me that the scenario describes a plausible possible counterexample to
the dichotomy of ground. When describing it, I took care not to pre-judge the
question whether ½Gþa, the fact that a instantiates positive schmarge, is grounded in
something, and if so, by what. We shall now ask that question.
It seems to me that ½Gþa does not have any full grounds. There do not appear to
be any suitable candidates around to play that role. Yet I would argue that ½Gþa is
partially grounded. Let [Ha] be the fact that a is composed of an even number of
particles each of which has F. It is then plausible that in world w, ½Gþa is partially
grounded in [Ha], or perhaps by [Ha] together with a pertinent fact l concerning the
laws of nature of w. After all, [Ha] and l together go some way towards explaining
½Gþa; and it is natural to say that ½Gþa obtains because [Ha] does, or in virtue of
[Ha] obtaining.19
So we have at least one example where Dichotomy plausibly fails. To warm up
for the second potential example, which involves ideas about totality, ponder
proposition 1.11 of the Tractatus:
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
The addition of ‘‘these being all the facts’’ is prompted by the need to account for
some negative and universally quantified truths. On one way of spelling out this
idea, there is a plurality C of first-order facts, and there is also a further fact t (for
‘‘totality’’): that C are all the first-order facts. The totality fact t thus entails each one
of the facts in C.
According to the most developed account of this kind, presented in D.
M. Armstrong (2004, 72), the fact t involves a relation of alling or totalling.
Specifically, it is the fact that the mereological fusion of all first-order facts stands in
that relation to the property of being a first-order fact.20
19 The distinctive kind of explanation in question is metaphysical explanation. Metaphysical explanation
does not depend on the conversational context or our epistemic situation. We can thus rule out a
contrastive reading of the demand for an explanation of ½Gþa, along the lines of ‘‘why does a have
positive schmarge rather than negative schmarge?’’
20 Armstrong uses the term ‘state of affairs’ where I use ‘fact’.
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Supposing that this is correct, we can now ask what, if any, relationships of
ground obtain between C and t.
The view under consideration belongs to the logical atomist tradition. The facts
in C are taken to be logical atoms. In the key of ground, this can be expressed by
saying that they are ungrounded. Specifically, none of them is grounded in t, either
fully or partially.
Even if C consists of all the first-order facts, it is possible for all the facts in C to
obtain without t: there could be further first-order facts, after all. This point was
emphasized by Russell, and it presumably prompted Wittgenstein to add ‘‘and by
these being all the facts’’ to ‘‘the world is determined by the facts’’. On the widely
held assumption that grounds necessitate what they ground, it cannot be the case
that C is a full ground for t.
What is left open so far is whether C is a partial ground for t. It seems to me that
it is: t is a complex fact which entails the obtaining of all members of C; indeed, the
members of C are naturally taken to be constituents of the complex fact.21 Hence
t holds in part because the facts in C do, or in virtue of the facts in C obtaining.
But in the ontology in question, there is no plausible candidate for a full ground
of t. We have seen that C is not—this is the reason why the totality fact has been
introduced in the first place. Moreover, apart from t and the members of C, there is
not really anything else in the logical atomist’s ontology.22
This second potential counterexample to Dichotomy could be resisted by
adopting a different, purely exclusive account of the totality fact: as the fact that at
most the actual first-order facts obtain—a fact that does not entail any of them, and
is arguably not partially grounded in any of them. We need to note, though, that this
is indeed a different conception of totality facts than the inclusive one that is
adopted in the relevant literature. Moreover, the change in conception may incur
costs. When discussing the two conceptions, Kit Fine notes that he is ‘‘inclined to
21 On Armstrong’s theory (2004, 72–73), they may not be: parts of a mereological sum are not in general
constituents of that sum. But the very fact that they are not—that the first relatum of the alling relation is a
mereological sum, not some more structured entity—creates trouble for Armstrong’s theory. He proposes
to use alling in the analysis of universally quantified statements, as follows:
‘‘All As are Bs’’ is true iff there is something that alls A and also alls A ^ B.
But this analysis gives absurd results. Consider ‘‘All parts of the universe have a mass of at least 1000
kg,’’ which is falsified by people, pens, and particles, among others. But it comes out as true under the
analysis: there is something, namely the universe, that is the fusion of all parts of the universe, and hence
stands in the alling relation to ‘‘being a part of the universe’’; and that very thing is also the fusion of all
parts of the universe that have a mass of at least 1000 kg, and hence stands in the alling relation ‘‘being a
part of the universe that has a mass of at least 1000 kg’’.
Things get worse. ‘‘All parts of the universe have a mass of less than 1000 kg’’ also comes out true,
under the assumption that the universe has a decomposition into things that each have a mass of less than
1000 kg. (A decomposition into protons, neutrons, electrons, and kindred particles would do the trick.)
Together, these two general claims propositions entail the absurd claim that nothing is a part of the
universe.
The problem would not arise with classes in the place of fusions.
22 Armstrong accepts higher-order states of affairs, but they are supposed to be a ‘‘free lunch’’ given t; in
our terminology, they are grounded in t, rather than being grounds of t.
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prefer [the inclusive conception] on theoretical grounds’’ (2012a, 62).23 Fine’s
and Armstrong’s theoretical considerations—discussion of which would lead us
too far afield—may or may not turn out to be weighty. The important point,
though, is that if their account of totality were rejected to save Dichotomy, that
principle would turn out to have revisionary consequences. This confirms my
suspicion that the standard account of partial ground, which entails Dichotomy,
is not a harmless regimentation of our talk of ground. Rather, it embodies
substantive metaphysical commitments—a theme I shall take up again in the
next section.
I started this section by reporting a putative counterexample to Dichotomy due
to Kit Fine. While I do not find the example itself convincing, I wish to draw on
Fine’s work to bolster my claim that Dichotomy may fail. Fine suggests his
example in the course of distinguishing various different notions of partial ground
that are definable in his semantics. At a minimum, his framework can be used to
show that a notion of partial ground that violates Dichotomy is logically well-
behaved.
The semantics involves some entities—‘‘verifiers’’ or ‘‘truthmakers’’—standing
in mereological relations. As I show in the ‘‘Appendix’’, Dichotomy is closely
related to the holding of the so-called ‘‘Weak Supplementation’’ principle among
the verifiers. Such a principle rules out models, inter alia, where something has just
one proper part. The totality fact t, in the above example, is naturally taken to have a
verifier which has the fusion of C, the first-order facts, as a proper part, but no parts
which do not overlap that fusion.
If we are prepared to take the semantics with metaphysical seriousness, rather
than being instrumentalist about it, we can mine the literature on mereology to
construct further potential counterexamples to Dichotomy. While Weak Supple-
mentation is widely accepted, there is also notable precedent for rejecting it. Franz
Brentano (1981, 47) thought that the thinking soul has the soul as a part, but is not
the result of the soul ‘‘acquiring a second part.’’ He holds the same about what he
calls ‘‘logical parts’’:
When we compare ‘‘red thing’’ and ‘‘colored thing’’ we find that the latter is
contained in the former, but we cannot specify a second thing that could be
added to the first as an entirely new element, i.e., one that would not contain
the concept, colored thing. (1981, 112)
Another precedent is provided by Whitehead, on whose theory open interiors are
proper parts of topologically closed regions, even though there are no boundaries
which could serve as supplements.24
23 Fine eschews appeal to totality facts in favour of appeal to totality claims, but that difference is
immaterial here.
24 At least, this is so on the formalization of Whitehead’s theory in Clarke (1981). See Simons (1987,
97–98) for some discussion.
Drawing on an unpublished talk of mine, Jessica Wilson (2018b, 2019) mentions such putative failures
of weak supplementation in connection with partial grounds that are not parts of full grounds.
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In the more recent literature, further potential counterexamples to Weak
Supplementation have been explored. It would be beyond the scope of this article
to survey that work.25 Some of these examples might be adapted to challenge
Dichotomy directly; others indirectly, via Fine’s mereological models for ground
discussed in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
5 Weak and strong fundamentality
If I am right that Dichotomy may fail, we need to distinguish between weak and
strong fundamentality. While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to explore
the ramifications of such a move, I shall close by sketching one way in which it
might be significant.
Weak and strong fundamentality will split the theoretical role described at the
beginning of this article. Weak fundamentality constrains ontology: accepting only
the strongly fundamental entities is not enough to meet one’s commitments.
Likewise, it is weak fundamentality that limits modal recombination: everything
supervenes on the weakly fundamental. In contrast, it is strong fundamentality, at
best, that guarantees modal recombination.
Recognising that these roles are played by different properties may prompt us to
reassess a number of metaphysical theses and arguments. Consider Humeanism in
metaphysics. To a first approximation, contemporary Humeanism holds that there is
a modally recombinable basis for everything. The paradigmatic representative is
David Lewis, whose ‘‘pointillism’’ takes the recombinable basis to consist of
instantiations of perfectly natural qualities at spacetime points. But the view comes
in a number of different versions. The members of the basis may be objects, or
properties, or facts, or entities of yet another category. The key relation between the
basis and the rest may be supervenience, truthmaking, dependence, ground,
building, or yet something else. Some view in the vicinity of Humeanism is shaping
the view of a number of contemporary metaphysicians, regardless of whether they
label their view as ‘‘Humean’’.
The principle that the members of the basis are recombinable is a powerful one: it
has been used to argue that there is no such thing as a structural universal (Lewis
1986), or a totality state of affairs (Cameron 2010), and that facts involving the
building relations are themselves built (Bennett 2017, 190). Moreover, the principle
has played a key role in recent arguments for prioriy monism, the view that one and
only entity is fundamental (Cameron 2010; Schaffer 2010). Priority monism is
compatible with the principle: if modal recombinability is just the lack of necessary
connections among distinct members of the basis, then a basis consisting of one
element is trivially recombinable. Its proponents argue that given certain other
plausible background views, it is the only view compatible with it.26
25 See Varzi (2016) for references.
26 Cameron uses Humeanism to argue against totality states of affairs, as just noted, and he argues further
that a plurality without a totality state of affairs would not be base in the relevant sense. Schaffer’s
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I shall not discuss whether Humeanism does indeed have the implications it is
claimed to have. Rather, my interest is in the status of Humeanism itself—a view
more often assumed than argued for. What might motivate it? It is not hard to see
that fundamentality might figure as a middle term in an argument for it.27 For
specificity, take Humeanism to be the view that there is a recombinable grounding
base. Then the view is a consequence of the following two premises:
(1) The fundamental facts are modally recombinable.
(2) The fundamental facts form a grounding base.
We can see this line of reasoning as a master argument for Humeanism. I suspect
that it plays an important, though mostly implicit, role in motivating the view.
Perhaps the most explicit argument in this form is given in Schaffer (2010). Schaffer
is concerned with objects rather than facts, and talks of ‘‘basic’’ rather than
‘‘fundamental’’ entities. He defines a concrete object as basic iff it does not depend
on anything (38). He also points out, plausibly enough, that ‘‘[i]f entities are
metaphysically independent, then they should be modally unconstrained in
recombination’’ (40). So his basic entities are modally recombinable—a variant
of (1) above. His crucial move is to requires that ‘‘the basic entities must be
complete, in the sense of providing a blueprint of reality’’ (39)—a variant of (2). He
concludes that the basic objects form a modally recombinable dependence basis, a
thesis which entails a version of Humeanism.
But if the argument of this paper is right, premise (1) in the master argument for
Humeanism plausibly holds if we are talking about B-fundamentality, and premise
(2) if we are talking about A-fundamentality. For the argument to go through,
B-fundamentality and A-fundamentality need to coincide. But they may not, as I
have argued in this paper. If that argument has succeeded, Humeanism is no longer
mandatory, and the set of options for our fundamental world view has correspond-
ingly expanded.
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Footnote 26 continued
argument from Humeanism to monism has too many moving parts to be summarised here; for a useful
discussion, see Raven (2016).
27 For a detailed discussion of alternative ways of motivating something like Humeanism, see Wang
(2016).
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Appendix: Failures of Dichotomy in mereological frames
In his 2012a, b, Kit Fine gives a semantics for ground in terms of sets of ‘‘states’’,
‘‘verifiers’’ or ‘‘truthmakers’’ that stand in mereological relations. This ‘‘Appendix’’
investigates what mereological conditions correspond to the failure of Dichotomy.
Fine presents his mereology in a guise that may look unfamiliar to many
metaphysicians. First, he assumes the existence of a ‘‘null individual’’ 0, which is
part of everything. Such a putative entity has typically been shunned by
mereologists. I will follow Fine here, since his is the standard framework for this
kind of semantics. But I wish to emphasize that my results do not depend on there
being a null individual. Indeed, admitting 0 leads to a number of complications in
my discussion.
Second, Fine’s notion of a fusion relates differently to parthood than either of the
two notions of fusion that have currency in the metaphysical literature. For Fine, a
fusion of some things is their least upper bound. If t has every member of G as a part
and every part of t overlaps some member of G—one common notion of fusion—
then t is a fusion of G in Fine’s sense; and if the mereology is distributive (Fine
2017, 646), the converse holds as well. Stronger assumptions would be needed to
guarantee coincidence with t’s being a fusion of G in the sense that something
overlaps t just in case it overlaps some member of G.28
Third, Fine (2012b) chooses a fusion function as his primitive, rather than
parthood.29 Hence he does not require an axiom guaranteeing the existence of
fusions. If
F
G is the fusion of members of the set G,
Ffx; yg ¼ Ffyg can be used
to define the parthood relation xY y . However, along with Fine himself in a more
recent piece of work (2017), I shall take parthood as primitive.
While Fine uses mereological frames to give a semantics for a family of binary
sentential connectives, I shall use them to give a model—in the non-model-theoretic
sense of the word—of facts and relations of ground that hold between them. The
mereological frames can be used for either purpose, just like possible worlds frames
can be used either to give a model theory for formal languages, or to give a model of
propositions and certain relations like entailment and incompatibility between them.
A binary relationY is a partial order on a set F iff it is reflexive, transitive, and
anti-symmetric. An element y is an upper bound of a subset G of F iff xYy for all
x 2 G; and it is a fusion or least upper bound of G iff it is an upper bound of G, and
for every upper bound z of G, yYz.
A mereological frame F is a pair hF;Yi, where F is a set andY a partial order
on F such that every G  F has a fusion. Since Y is anti-symmetric, every G  F
has a unique fusion
F
G. I shall also use the following symbols and definitions for
the null element, proper parthood, the set of non-null proper parts, and overlap,
respectively:
28 For a careful discussion of these three notions and their relationship, see Hovda (2009).
29 See Kleinschmidt (2017) for discussion.
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• 0 :¼ F ;
• x y :¼ xYy ^ x 6¼ y
• pðxÞ :¼ fz : z x ^ z 6¼ 0g
• Oxy :¼ 9xðz 6¼ 0 ^ zYx ^ zYyÞ
Fine (2012b) calls the members of F ‘facts’, and non-empty subsets of F that are
closed, in the sense of including fusions of all of their non-empty subsets,
‘propositions’. These latter entities are eligible to be semantic values in his
framework, and they are quantified over in the definition of ground. I shall diverge
from his use, and call such subsets of F ‘facts’. Since we can disregard false
propositions or non-actual verifiers in an application to the pure logic of ground—as
opposed to certain other semantic phenomena Fine (2017) is interested in—there is
nothing incongruous in my usage. While the question whether we should take facts
to be the relata of ground is an important one, I take it to be largely orthogonal to the
concerns of the present paper.
More precisely, I shall take facts to be those sets of truthmakers that are, in the
terminology of Fine (2017, 647), neither vacuous nor trivial, and closed under
fusion.
Definition 1 A set G  F is a fact iff G is non-empty, 0 62 G, and for every non-
empty H  G, FH 2 G.30
For a set of facts C, let a choice function for C be a function that maps every
g 2 C to one of its members. (Notation: when a subset of F is also a fact, I
sometimes denote it with a lower-case variable f ; g; . . ..) Since facts are non-empty,
every set of facts has a choice function. Let a choice for C be the range of a choice
function for C.
Let C be a set of facts, and f a fact.31
• C is a full proto-ground of f iff for any choice G for C,
FðGÞ 2 f ;
• C is a partial proto-ground of f iff for some D, C [ D is a full proto-ground for
f.32
We can now define partial ground and full ground:
• C is a partial ground for f iff C is a partial proto-ground for f, and f is not a
partial proto-ground for any g 2 C.
• C is a full ground for f iff C is a full proto-ground for f, and f is not a partial
proto-ground for any g 2 C.
30 I often leave relativization to a mereological frame implicit.
31 When giving the truth-conditions for claims of ground, I shall use set-theoretic vocabulary, due to its
familiarity and convenience. (Though I shall sometimes write f instead of ffg to avoid clutter.) Officially,
the relation of ground is plural on the left, rather than relating a set of facts to a fact.
32 Fine says ‘‘weak ground’’, suggesting that a species of ground is being defined, where I say ‘‘proto-
ground’’, suggesting an auxiliary device is being introduced. There is no need to address the question
what the status of weak ground is.
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I shall now investigate under what conditions the following principle, introduced in
Sect. 3, holds in a mereological frame.
If f has a partial ground, it has a full ground. ðDichotomyÞ
Say that x is atomic iff x 6¼ 0 and pðxÞ ¼ ;; and x is properly fused iff x ¼ F pðxÞ.
We note that an atomic x is not the fusion of ;; hence it is not properly fused.
The following principle says that if something has a non-null proper part, it is
properly fused:
8xð9yðy 6¼ 0 ^ y xÞ !
G
pðxÞ ¼ xÞ ðProper FusionÞ
Proposition 3 If Proper Fusion holds in a mereological frame, so does
Dichotomy.
Proof Suppose that C is a partial ground for f. Since f is a fact, it is non-empty and
closed under non-empty fusions, such that
F
f 2 f . We now show by reductio thatF
f :¼ xf is not atomic. Suppose that it is. Then either f ¼ fxf g or f ¼ fxf ; 0g.
Since f is non-trivial, 0 62 f , and hence f ¼ fxf g. Given that for some D, C [ D is a
full proto-ground for f,
F
GYxf for every choice G for C. Since every member of C
is a fact and thus non-trivial, 0 62 G. Hence G ¼ fxf g and C ¼ ffg. It follows that
f is a full and thus a partial proto-ground for a member of C, contradicting the
assumption that C is a partial ground for f.
We now construct a full ground for f. Set Df :¼ ffxg : x 2 pð
F
f Þg. That is, Df
consists of unit sets of non-null proper parts of the fusion of the members of f. We
verify that all members of Df are facts: as unit sets, they are non-empty, of course,
and closed under non-empty fusions; and they do not contain 0 given the definition
of the function p. Since
F
f is not atomic, Df is non-empty.
We first show that C [ Df is a full proto-ground for f. Consider any choice G for
C [ Df . Its fusion
F
G is the fusion of a choice for C and a choice for Df . Since C is
a partial ground for f, every member of the choice set for C is a part of
F
f . As a set
of unit sets, Df has only one choice set pð
F
f Þ, each member of which is a part ofF
f . Hence
F
f is an upper bound of G, such that
F
GY
F
f . Moreover, we haveF
pðF f ÞYFG. Since Proper Fusion holds, F pðF f Þ ¼ F f , and hence F fYFG.
By anti-symmetry,
F
f ¼ FG, and hence FG 2 f .
It remains to show that there is no member of C or Df for which f is a partial
proto-ground. Since by assumption C is a partial ground for f, f is not a partial proto-
ground for any g 2 C. Consider any member fxg of Df and any K. Since
F
f 2 f ,
ffg [ K will have a choice G with F fYFG. Given that x F f , x 6¼ FG, and
hence
F
G 62 fxg. It follows that ffg [ K is not a full proto-ground for fxg, and thus
that ffg is not a partial ground for fxg. h
(For those familiar with Fine’s terminology relating to the notion of partial
ground: Proposition 3 entails that if Proper Fusion holds, then if g is a strict partial
ground of f, it is also a partial strict ground of f. Since the converse holds without
mereological assumptions, as Fine notes, it follows that the notions of strict partial
ground and of partial strict ground coincide, given the assumption of Proper
Fusion.)
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We also get a necessary condition for Dichotomy to hold:
Proposition 4 If x is non-atomic but not properly fused, then p(x) is a partial
ground for fxg, but nothing is a full ground for fxg.
Proof We first verify that p(x) is a fact. By definition, 0 62 pðxÞ. Since x is non-
atomic, either x ¼ 0 or pðxÞ 6¼ ;. But 0 is properly fused: 0 ¼ F pð0Þ. Since x is not
properly fused, x 6¼ 0, and hence p(x) is not empty. To show that p(x) is closed
under non-empty subsets, let H  pðxÞ. Since H is non-empty, FH 6¼ 0. Since x is
an upper bound of p(x), it is an upper bound of H; and since
F
H is the least upper
bound of H,
F
HYx. But since x is not properly fused, x 6¼ F pðxÞ and hence
x 6¼ FH. Hence FH x.
It is easy to see that fxg is also a fact. Since the fusion of any choice for
pðxÞ [ fxg is x, pðxÞ [ fxg is a full proto-ground for fxg. Since no y with xYy
belongs to p(x), fxg is not a partial proto-ground for p(x). This establishes that
p(x) is a partial ground for fxg.
However, nothing is a full ground for fxg. Suppose that C is a full proto-ground
for fxg, and let G be any choice for C. Then FG ¼ x. Hence any member of any
h 2 C is a part of x. Since x is not properly fused, G includes a part of x that is not a
proper part of x. Hence x 2 G, and thus x 2 h for some h 2 C. It follows that fxg is a
full, and thus a partial, proto-ground for h. Hence C is not a full ground for fxg. h
Hence we obtain a mereological condition that is necessary and sufficient:
Corollary 1 Dichotomy holds in a mereological frame iff Proper Fusion does.
Proof If Proper Fusion holds, then so does Dichotomy, by Proposition 3. For the
other direction, suppose that Proper Fusion is false. Then there is a non-atomic x that
is not properly fused. By Proposition 4, p(x) is a partial ground for fxg, but nothing
is a full ground for fxg. Hence Dichotomy fails. h
I noted that admitting 0 leads to complications in my discussion. Definition 1 has
the consequence that f0g is not a fact. This is crucial for our result to hold. For
suppose that f0g is a fact. Then it is a partial proto-ground of every fact, and a
partial ground of every fact distinct from itself. If x is atomic, then fxg has no full
ground, but it has f0g as a partial ground, falsifying Dichotomy. Our results still
hold, however, if we allow facts to include 0, as long as they do not only include 0.
That is, they hold if a set is defined to be fact iff it is non-empty, closed under non-
empty fusions, and distinct from f0g.33
33 To adapt the proof of Proposition 3, note that any g with 0 2 g will be zero-grounded, and thus fully
grounded; and that whenever C is a full proto-ground for f and 0 2 g 2 C, then C n fgg will also be a full
proto-ground for f.
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The notion of something’s being properly fused is not one among those discussed
in the mereological literature, to the best of my knowledge.34 I shall now relate
Proper Fusion to another condition that is more familiar to metaphysicians: Weak
Supplementation. In the presence of a null element, this can be stated as follows
(Hovda 2009, 74):35
8x8yðy 6¼ 0 ^ y x ! 9zðz 6¼ 0 ^ zYx ^ :OyzÞÞ ðWeak SupplementationÞ
Proposition 5 If Weak Supplementation holds in a mereological frame, so does
Proper Fusion.
Proof Suppose y 6¼ 0 and y x. Set t :¼ F pðxÞ. We need to show that x ¼ t.
Since x is an upper bound and t the least upper bound of p(x), tYx. If xYt, then
x ¼ t by anti-symmetry, and we are done. So suppose, for reductio, that xYt is
false. Then t x, and since t 6¼ 0, Weak Supplementation guarantees that there is
z with z 6¼ 0 and zYx that does not overlap t. Then not tYz, and since tYx holds,
z 6¼ x. Hence z x, which together with z 6¼ 0 gives us z 2 pðxÞ. But since z and t do
not overlap, not zYt, so t is not an upper bound of p(x) after all, contradicting
t ¼ F pðxÞ. h
In finite frames, the converse also holds:
Proposition 6 If Proper Fusion holds in a finite mereological frame, so does Weak
Supplementation.
Proof Define q(x) as p(x) if pðxÞ 6¼ ;, and as fxg otherwise. Set r0ðxÞ :¼ qðxÞ, and
riþ1ðxÞ :¼
S
y2riðxÞ qðyÞ.
Assume that F has only finitely many members, and pick x and y with y 6¼ 0 and
y x. We show by induction that for every i, riðyÞ  riðxÞ. The base step holds
because proper parthood is transitive. Suppose that z 2 riþ1ðyÞ. Then z is a member
of q(t) for some t 2 riðyÞ. By the induction hypothesis, t 2 riðxÞ. Hence z 2 riþ1ðxÞ.
Given Proper Fusion and the associativity of the fusion operation, x ¼ F riðxÞ for
every i. Since x 6¼ y, riðxÞ 6¼ riðyÞ, and hence riðxÞ n riðyÞ is non-empty for every i.
We can verify that riþ1ðxÞ  riðxÞ, for every i. Since F has finitely many members,
there is k such that rkðxÞ ¼ rkþ1ðxÞ. It follows that every member of rkðxÞ is atomic, in
particular any member z of rkðxÞ n rkðyÞ. Then z is a part of x that does not overlap
y. Since x and y were chosen arbitrarily, Weak Supplementation holds. h
34 Varzi (2014, 48) claims that ‘‘everything is identical with the fusion of its proper parts’’ is entailed by
‘‘no composite things have exactly the same proper parts’’ together with ‘‘any non-empty collection of
things . . . has a fusion.’’ However, in a structure consisting of b and its sole proper part a, b is not the least
upper bound of the set fag of its proper parts. Varzi defines a fusion as ‘‘something that has all those
things as parts and has no part that is disjoint from each of them’’. In that sense, both a and b are fusions
of the proper parts of b, such that we cannot speak of ‘‘the fusion’’ here.
35 Dixon (2016a) discusses a supplementation principle for ground, but in a context where partial
grounds are defined as parts of full grounds, and where Dichotomy is thus guaranteed to hold; the
question he addresses is whether a partial ground f can be turned into a full ground by adding further facts
that do not overlap f, in a sense of overlap that he defines.
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Hence Weak Supplementation and Proper Fusion stand and fall together in finite
frames.
The converse may fail in the infinite case, however. Consider the (positive and
negative) real numbers with x and x added, with the usual ordering interpreted as
parthood. This is clearly a partial order, and every subset has a least upper bound.
Nothing is weakly supplemented in this structure, since any two non-zero elements
overlap in their minimum. Nonetheless, every element is the least upper bound of
those smaller than it.
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